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Margaret Cavendish (1623-73) held a number of surprising philosophical views. These included a 
materialist panpsychism, and some views in what we might call environmental ethics. Panpsychism, 
though certainly not unheard of, is still often a surprising view. Views in environmental ethics – even 
just views that involve a measure of environmental concern – are unusual to find in early modern 
European philosophy. Cavendish held both of these surprising views. This paper examines them, 
and asks about their possible relationship. 
Section 1 briefly introduces Cavendish’s panpsychism. Section 2 looks at her environmental 
ethics, as found in her first book, the 1653 Poems, and Fancies. With this material in place, I then ask 
in section 3 what the two views have to do with one another. One might suspect that panpsychism 
provides some reasons for environmental concern. I argue, however, that Cavendish did not derive 
her environmental ethics from her panpsychism. If there is a connection, it is a developmental one, 
leading from the ethics to the panpsychism. Section 4 then considers various objections to that 
reading. The investigation of these issues also provides an occasion for thinking more generally 
about how Cavendish’s views fit together, and whether she developed a systematic philosophy in the 
manner of several of her contemporaries. 
 
1. Cavendish’s panpsychism 
Margaret Cavendish was a panpsychist. She thought – that is, it was a feature of her mature system, 
her view of the 1660s – that there is sensitive and rational matter. The sensitivity and rationality of 
this matter is a fundamental, irreducible feature of it. Such matter is spread throughout the world – 
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one should not think that, for example, the sensitive matter is in the eyes and the rational matter is 
in the brain. Rather, both can be found everywhere, albeit mixed together with inanimate matter. 
Thus, Cavendish said that: 
these sensitive and rational parts of matter are the purest and subtilest parts of Nature, as the 
active parts, the knowing, understanding and prudent parts, the designing, architectonical 
and working parts, nay, the Life and Soul of Nature, and that there is not any Creature or 
part of nature without this Life and Soul; and that not onely Animals, but also Vegetables, 
Minerals and Elements, and what more is in Nature, are endued with this Life and Soul, 
Sense and Reason (PL “A Preface to the Reader”). 
Cavendish’s system thus involved the presence of thought in surprising places. Moreover, she 
thought that many different sorts of natural beings have knowledge and perception. Granted, 
Cavendish did say that the different sorts of beings have different sorts of knowledge and 
perception: “the air has an elemental, and the glass a mineral, but not an animal perception”.1 
Nevertheless, the knowledge and perception of minerals is indeed a sort of knowledge and 
perception, even if it is different from our knowledge and perception. 
 
2. Poems, and Fancies 
The source for Cavendish’s views in what we might call environmental ethics is her first book, the 
Poems, and Fancies, which was published in 1653. 
I will not attempt a general account of the Poems, and Fancies, or even of its ethics, or its 
nature poetry. Instead, I draw attention to four particular themes. The first theme is that man treats 
nature poorly. The second is the ethics of our treatment of animals. The third theme is what I will call a non-
                                               
1 PL 1.24. See also PL 2.13 on animal, mineral, and vegetable knowledge, and PL 4.30 for a defense 
of the view that many non-human creatures are wise. For the abbreviations I use in giving references 
to Cavendish’s works, see the bibliography. 
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literal panpsychism. The fourth theme is really a way of arguing: what I will call here speculation and the 
‘who knows?’ argument.2 
There are certainly interpretive complications here. Caution is needed in any attempt to 
extract ethical views from the poetry. However, poetry often was used to convey philosophical views 
in the period. Moreover, if one is interested in environmental ethics, this is the obvious place to start 
in Cavendish’s texts. Beyond that, some of Cavendish’s poems really do seem to have relevant 
messages as their point, and this is often not a matter of complex or subtle interpretation – we find 
some rather blunt relevant statements. 
 
2.1. Man treats nature poorly 
I begin with “A Dialogue between an Oake, and a Man cutting him downe” (P&F 66-70). The poem 
is what its title says it is. Thus, the oak begins: 
WHY cut you off my Bowes, both large, and long,  
That keepe you from the heat, and scortching Sun; 
And did refresh your fainting Limbs from sweat?  
From thundring Raines I keepe you free, from Wet;  
When on my Barke your weary head would lay,  
Where quiet sleepe did take all Cares away. 
(P&F 66) 
In the body of the poem, the man offers various justifications to the oak, which the oak is 
disinclined to accept. One might, cautiously, see Cavendish as expressing some concern about 
                                               
2 Boyle (2018, 189-214) looks at Cavendish’s views on the relationship between humans and the 
environment, drawing on a wide range of texts. She helpfully emphasizes that we should not see too 
much in Cavendish’s expressions of such views: she did not object to eating animals, and did not 
object in principle to experimenting on animals, or to hunting them, even though she objected to 
some ways those things could be done. 
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humans’ use of trees in particular, and natural resources more generally. This is interesting in its own 
right.3 However, the poem ends with, and thus emphasizes, the misery of man, not the misery of the 
tree: 
Alas, poore Oake, thou understandst, nor can  
Imagine halfe the misery of Man.  
All other Creatures onely in Sense joyne,  
But Man hath something more, which is divine.  
He hath a Mind, doth to the Heavens aspire,  
A Curiosity for to inquire: 
[…] 
(P&F 70) 
We have here a sort of encounter between human and nature.4 Of course the encounter in 
Cavendish’s poem is not a literal encounter – Cavendish did not think one could actually converse 
with trees. And the point that if a tree could speak, this is what it would say, is a point that one can 
make whatever one thinks about the panpsychism issue. 
More such discussions can be seen in another dialogue, “A Dialogue betwixt Man, and 
Nature” (PF 58-9).5  
Nature 
                                               
3 One might see a connection here to some of the claims of Merchant (1980) and take Cavendish to 
be a critic of the exploitation of nature. Cavendish does appear in Merchant (1980, 270-2), but not in 
this role. See also Merchant’s comments on “The disruption of the forest ecosystem by the rise of 
early modern industry, coupled with the careless use and mismanagement of resources” (Merchant 
1980, 67). 
4 On encounter in the context of panpsychism and environmental ethics, compare Mathews (2003, 
77). 
5 These dialogues have an interesting similarity to some sections of Cavendish’s later works of 
natural philosophy, where different voices express different points of view. Consider, for example, 
“An Argumental Discourse” between “former thoughts” and “latter thoughts” in the Observations 
upon Experimental Philosophy (Cavendish 2001, 23-42). 
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Why doth Man-kind complaine, and make such Moane? 
May not I work my will with what’s my owne? 
But Men among themselves contract, and make 
A Bargaine for my Tree; that Tree will take: 
Most cruelly do chop in peeces small, 
And formes it as he please, then builds withall. 
Although that Tree by me was made to stand, 
Just as it growes, not to be cut by Man.   
Man 
O Nature, Trees are dull, and have no Sense, 
And therefore feel not paine, nor take offence. 
Nature6 
But Beasts have life and Sense, and passion strong, 
Yet cruell man doth kill, and doth them wrong. 
To take that life, I gave, before the time 
I did ordaine, the injury is mine. 
Man 
What Ill man doth, Nature did make him do, 
For he by Nature is prompt thereunto. 
(P&F 58-9) 
Ethically, we have a distinction here between trees and beasts. But we also have some reflection on 
the ethics of doing what is natural. Cavendish in effect – in a manner familiar from other discussions 
of this issue – distinguishes different senses in which something might be natural. In the first sense, 
                                               
6 These four lines are wrongly attributed to Man in the 1653 edition – at least, the word ‘Nature’ is 
missing – but this was corrected in later editions. 
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there is a distinction between what is natural and what is done by humans, but in the second sense 
there is not, as humans are recognized as part of nature. That these different approaches are possible 
is clear enough – whether Cavendish wants to be on one side of the issue, and if so which one, is 
less so. 
 
2.2. The ethics of our treatment of animals 
Cavendish worries about our general treatment of nature. Within that, she worries in particular that 
we treat animals poorly. This theme is nicely illustrated by Cavendish’s two poems about hunting: 
“The Hunting of the Hare”, and “The Hunting of the Stag”, which we find next to each other in 
Poems, and Fancies.7 
Both poems are largely devoted to the description of hunts. “The Hunting of the Stag” is 
more straightforwardly just that. There is some praise of the courage of the stag. But there’s not 
there, what there is at the end of “The Hunting of the Hare”, a rather blunt statement of a general 
view about what’s going on. That is: 
As if that God made Creatures for Mans meat,  
To give them Life, and Sense, for Man to eat;  
Or else for Sport, or Recreations sake,  
Destroy those Lifes that God saw good to make:  
Making their Stomacks, Graves, which full they fill  
With Murther'd Bodios, that in sport they kill.  
Yet Man doth think himselfe so gentle, mild,  
When he of Creatures is most cruell wild.  
And is so Proud, thinks onely he shall live,  
                                               
7 For a more detailed examination of the two poems about hunting, see Suzuki (2015, 229-32). 
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That God a God-like Nature did him give.  
And that all Creatures for his sake alone,  
Was made for him, to Tyramize upon.  
(P&F 112-3) 
Man, proud and arrogant, thinks that nature’s creatures exist for him to do with as he pleases. But 
this, Cavendish thinks, is an over-reaching mistake. Here we might consider a comment of Katie 
Whitaker, biographer of Cavendish: 
This critique of human arrogance was a frequent theme … Her two poems “The Hunting of 
the Hare and “The Hunting of the Stag” abandoned the human perspective to tell their 
stories from the point of view of the quarry – an unconventional move that turned these 
works into passionate denunciations of human cruelty and pride (Whitaker 2002, 141).8 
Cavendish was perhaps not entirely opposed to hunting and hunters.9 But the judgment that humans 
have an over-confident opinion of their relative place in the world certainly recurs in her later works 
of natural philosophy. Consider, for example, Cavendish’s objections to Descartes’s argument in his 
Discourse against animal minds. Concluding her discussion, Cavendish says that other animals: 
may have as much intelligence and commerce betwixt each other, after their own manner 
and way, as men have after theirs: To which I leave them, and Man to his conceited 
prerogative and excellence (PL 1.36). 
Consider also the argument of Philosophical Letters 4.30, where Cavendish defends her view that 
                                               
8 An earlier critic remarked that in “The Hunting of the Hare”, the hare’s “ultimate end is lamented 
in the most astonishingly humanitarian way” (Perry 1968, 179), and also that “A Dialogue of Birds” 
(discussed below) “deserves to be known for its sympathetic description of nature. The different 
birds lament how badly man treats them but explain that Nature should receive no blame” (Perry 
1968, 176). More generally, Perry (1968, 197-84) offers a useful introduction to and survey of Poems, 
and Fancies. 
9 Note a comment in the Sociable Letters – “[N]or do I wonder that the Lord N. W. practices Riding, 
Fencing, Vaulting, Shooting, Hunting, Fortifying, Navigating, and the like, because he is an Heroick 
Man, fitter to Conquer a Nation, than to Dance a Galliard or Courant” (SL 33) – and see the 
discussion of Boyle (2018, 208-9). 
 8 
“every Creature hath life and knowledg, sense and reason”. She argues that “humane sense and 
reason may perceive, that wood, stone, or metal, acts as wisely as an animal”, and indeed that: 
Infinite examples may be given, and yet man says, all Vegetables and Minerals are insensible 
and irrational … Man doth not consider the various, intricate and obscure ways of Nature, 
unknown to any particular Creature; for what our senses are not capable to know, our reason 
is apt to deny. Truly, in my opinion, Man is more irrational then any of those Creatures, 
when he believes that all knowledg is not onely confined to one sort of Creatures, but to one 
part of one particular Creature, as the head, or brain of man (PL 4.30). 
That is, Cavendish thinks there is plenty of evidence for there being sense and reason in vegetables 
and minerals, albeit perhaps not evidence we can get from our senses. To deny this, she thinks, is 
irrational. Indeed, she concludes this letter by arguing that “to say, that no Creature adores and 
worships God, but Man … in my judgment, argues a great pride, self-conceit, and presumption”. 
Human error here is not just a mistake of reasoning, but also a sign of a problem of character. If 
humans were just not so arrogant, says Cavendish, they would see that she is right that there is sense 
and knowledge throughout the universe. 
 
2.3. Non-literal panpsychism 
The two themes above are fairly straightforward. That is, I take it that it is reasonably clear both 
what the identified theme is, and that it is indeed present in Poems, and Fancies. The third theme is less 
straightforward. I call this third theme ‘non-literal panpsychism’. The problem is in the title – surely 
non-literal panpsychism is not panpsychism at all. Moreover, a poet treating non-thinking or non-
communicating things as if they were thinking or communicating is surely not – at least not usually – 
trying to convince us that those creatures really could think or communicate – whatever else they 
might be trying to convince us of. I suggest that in Cavendish’s case, however, there is more going 
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on. I do not say that there is literal panpsychism in Poems, and Fancies, but I do want to think about 
how the non-literal panpsychism there relates to the literal panpsychism of her later works of natural 
philosophy. 
Consider “A Dialogue of Birds”, in which the birds talk about their lives, and what they seek 
and intend.  
AS I abroad in Feilds, and Woods did walke,  
I heard the Birds of severall things did talke:  
And on the Boughes would Gossip, prate, and chat,  
And every one discourse of this, and that. 
(P&F 70) 
Again there are ethical reflections within, even if one cannot really tie them to panpsychism. A 
sparrow, for example, brings up again the notion that men treat nature poorly: 
The Sparrow said, were our Condition such,  
But Men do strive with Nets us for to catch:  
With Guns, and Bowes they shoot us from the Trees,  
And by small shot, we oft our Lifes do leese,  
Because we pick a Cherry here, and there,  
When, God he knowes, we eate them in great feare.  
But Men will eat, untill their Belly burst,  
And surfets take: if we eat, we are curst. 
(P&F 71) 
Consider also “Earths Complaint”, which begins, it seems, with the earth complaining about mining.  
O Nature, Nature, hearken to my Cry,  
Each Minute wounded am, but cannot dye.  
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My Children which I from my Womb did beare,  
Do dig my Sides, and all my Bowels teare:  
Do plow deep Furroughs in my very Face,  
From Torment, I have neither time, nor place. 
(P&F 106) 
As with poems mentioned above that consider humans’ use of trees, we see here Cavendish 
questioning the use of nature as a resource.10 
I do not suggest that this dialogue is anything but metaphorical. But we might think about 
how this is a precursor of the mineral knowledge that turns up later on in Cavendish’s natural 
philosophy. In the Philosophical Letters, both glass (PL 1.24) and a bell (PL 2.13) are said to have this 
sort of knowledge or perception. It is contrasted with human knowledge, but also with elemental, 
animal, and vegetable knowledge or perception. Moreover, given Cavendish’s views about sensitive 
and rational matter, there is good systematic reason for thinking that metal objects (or rocks and 
ores, or things made from them) must have a sort of knowledge. There is that same good systematic 
reason for taking the Earth as a whole to have some such sort of knowledge.11 Somehow Cavendish 
got from non-literal panpsychism (‘if the Earth – or the hares or the birds or nature as a whole – 
could speak, these are the views it would express’) to literal panpsychism (there being thoughts, 
beliefs, and knowledge actually possessed by the hares, birds, pieces of metal and glass, the Earth, 
and the world as a whole). Thus, despite the shift, the earlier work is a notable precursor of the later 
work here. 
 
 
                                               
10 There’s another possible connection to Merchant (1980) here, about (reaction against) seeing the 
earth as simply a resource. 
11 There is a puzzling question about individuation, and about which parts of nature count as 
individual thinking things, which cannot be answered in passing here. 
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2.4. Speculation and the ‘who knows?’ argument 
My final theme again touches on the development of Cavendish’s view beyond the Poems, and Fancies. 
I begin here with another comment from Whitaker’s biography of Cavendish. Commenting on 
Cavendish’s nature poetry, including the two hunting poems, “A Dialogue of Birds” and “A 
Dialogue between an Oake, and a Man cutting him downe”, she says: 
Margaret was setting herself against the entire Judeo-Christian tradition of man's superiority 
over the natural world and his God-given right to use it as he wills. For all we know, she 
argued in yet more poems, beasts, birds, and fishes might have as much intelligence as us, or 
even more (Whitaker 2002, 142). 
It’s this last move that I want to notice and think about: the argument from ‘for all we know’ or 
even ‘it might be the case that’ to some apparent confidence that that actually is the case. 
Consider three of Cavendish’s “Discourses” in Poems, and Fancies: “A Discourse of Beasts” 
and the following poems “Of Fishes” and “Of Birds”. All three poems wonder whether various 
nonhuman animals have knowledge that we don’t know about. “A Discourse of Beasts” wonders 
what they think about the stars: 
WHO knowes; but Beasts, as they do lye,  
In Meadowes low, or else on Mountaines high?  
But that they do contemplate on the Sun,  
And how his daily, yearely Circles run.  
Whether the Sun about the Earth doth rove,  
Or else the Earth upon its owne Poles move.  
And in the Night, when twinkling Stars we see,  
Like Man, imagines them all Suns to bee.  
And may like Man, Stars, Planets number well,  
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And could they speak, they might their Motions tell.  
And how the Planets in each Orbe do move:  
’Gainst their Astrology no Man can prove.  
For they may know the Stars, and their Aspects,  
What Influence they cast, and their Effects.  
(P&F 105) 
The following discourses ask similar questions. “Of Fishes” wonders if fish understand things about 
the sea that we don’t. Cavendish asks, for example, whether fish can give reasons for the tides. The 
third poem here, “Of Birds”, wonders whether they know about the source of winds, or understand 
what thunder is. 
These poems might seem just to ask a question – ‘what might these other creatures know?’ 
Merely asking the question does not commit one to saying the other creatures do know anything. 
Writing a series of poems about it, on the other hand, does perhaps suggest that you think there is 
something to the suggestion. Moreover, Cavendish uses the same (‘it might be this way’) argument 
to support some of her natural philosophical views later on. Consider two passages from the 
Philosophical Letters.12 
But Man may have one way of Knowledge in Philosophy and other Arts, and other 
Creatures another way, and yet other Creatures manner or way may be as Intelligible and 
Instructive to each other as Man’s, I mean, in those things which are Natural (PL 1.10). 
[T]hough other Creatures have not the speech, nor Mathematical rules and demonstrations, 
with other Arts and Sciences, as Men; yet may their perceptions and observations be as wise 
as Men’s, and they may have as much intelligence and commerce betwixt each other, after 
                                               
12 Text in bold is emphasized by me. 
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their own manner and way, as men have after theirs (PL 1.36).13 
Those passages, if taken in isolation and given a minimal reading, might not seem remarkable – 
Cavendish is just speculating about a way things might be. But it seems to me that she intends a little 
more than that: a picture is suggested, and she wants us to adopt it.  
Sometimes, to be fair, Cavendish accompanies such suggestions with some supporting 
reasons. Consider, for example, discussions of animal minds, such as PL 1.36. But Cavendish’s 
supporting reasons there are at best deductions from her systematic view, rather than anything 
anyone else is likely to accept. What does that add up to, for the reader? Nothing much more, it can 
seem, than Cavendish saying that her view might be correct. Indeed it might be – but it would be 
nice to get more than that.14 Anyway, whatever one thinks about the virtues and drawbacks of this 
sort of argument, my more basic point is that here again one sees connections between the fanciful 
claims of Cavendish’s first book and the apparently more systematic and considered approach of her 
later works of natural philosophy.  
 
3. Connections between the views 
Cavendish, as we have just seen, proposes views in moral philosophy, indeed in what we might call 
environmental ethics. How, if at all, do those relate to her panpsychism?  
One possibility is that there is a deductive connection. That is, perhaps the ethical views are 
deduced from (or at least supported by) the panpsychism. The basic reason for suspecting this is 
that panpsychism discovers the existence of many more thinking, sensing, reasoning beings than are 
otherwise thought to exist. It is common to think that such beings have a different, higher moral 
status than inanimate beings. Thus it is plausible that discovering lots of them will have some ethical 
                                               
13 One might also look at PL 3.15 on magnetism: “one man may have a sympathetical affection to 
another man, when as this man hath an antipathetical aversion to him; and the same may be, for 
ought we know, betwixt Iron and the Loadstone, as also betwixt the Needle and the North”. 
14 On Cavendish’s attitude to reasons, argument, and evidence, see Wilson (2007). 
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consequences. To see such a connection in Cavendish’s work would also be a step towards seeing it 
as systematic, in the way that the work many prominent early modern philosophers was. In this 
picture the ethics would be part, maybe even the ultimate or highest part, of a systematic enquiry.15 
Chronology, however, counts against thinking there was such a deductive connection 
between Cavendish’s views. The mature panpsychist system was not obviously in place until her 
works of the 1660s, starting with 1663’s second edition of the Philosophical and Physical Opinions. The 
environmental ethical views are expressed in her first work, the 1653 Poems, and Fancies, and not in 
later works.16 The absence of an apparent deduction here is consonant with Eileen O’Neill’s related 
observation, that “in her publications, Cavendish did not explicitly discuss the political consequences 
of views in natural philosophy” (OEP, xx). 
Cavendish’s panpsychism and her environmental ethical views are related, despite there 
being no deductive connection between them. There is, I suggest, a developmental connection 
between the two views – the panpsychist views of Cavendish’s later work developed out of the 
ethical views of her earlier work. Moreover, the systematic philosopher is not the best model for 
Cavendish. A better model for understanding her approach is a more contemporary one: a scientist 
(or natural philosopher) who has ethical opinions, but does not derive them from her scientific 
inquiry.  
 Cavendish’s philosophical system can appear as an imaginative and creative accomplishment, 
                                               
15 Within today’s analytic philosophy, panpsychism is usually treated as a bit of technical philosophy 
of mind, and its ethical consequences, if any, are not usually discussed. Perhaps this absence of 
discussion is justified by the thought is that the mental states attributed to all of matter are so limited 
that they do not bring any new ethical state with them. For example, the micropsychic sorts of 
experiences Strawson (2006) discusses differ from our own experiences, even though they are 
supposed to be experiences. The mental states Cavendish discovers throughout the world seem 
more likely to be of ethical significance. Her panpsychism claims to discover the existence of 
thinking things, in more or less the usual sense, and such a discovery of new thinking beings at least 
might have ethical consequences. 
16 Even the works of the 1650s that seem to be in natural philosophy, the Philosophical Fancies and the 
first edition of the Philosophical and Physical Opinions, postdate (albeit only slightly in one case) the 
poems, and do not contain the environmental ethics. 
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but one presented without great regard for reasons and evidence. But where, one might ask, where 
did this system come from? To a fair extent, I suggest, it came from the fanciful poems of Poems, and 
Fancies. The metaphorical encounters – the non-literal panpsychism – harden into a more literal 
panpsychism, but to a considerable extent without supporting argument. That is, the poetical fancies 
turn into the natural philosophical system, but without natural philosophical argument.  
 
4. Objections  
4.1 Was Cavendish really a moral philosopher? 
I have been asking how Cavendish’s moral philosophy, in particular her environmental ethics, relates 
to her panpsychism. Cavendish seems however to say that she does not and will not engage in moral 
and political philosophy. Given this, how much sense does it make to ask about the relationship 
between her natural philosophy and her moral philosophy? 
Consider letter 13 of part 1 of Cavendish’s 1664 Philosophical Letters, which is part of her 
discussion of the work of Thomas Hobbes. Up to this point, Cavendish has been discussing 
passages from the early chapters of Leviathan, but here she tells us she will go no further in 
discussing that book. 
Having obeyed your commands in giving you my opinion of the first part of the book of 
that famous and learned author you sent me, I would go on; but seeing he treats in his 
following parts of the politics, I was forced to stay my pen, because of these following 
reasons. First, that a woman is not employed in state affairs, unless an absolute queen. Next, 
that to study the politics, is but loss of time, unless a man were sure to be a favourite to an 
absolute prince. Thirdly, that it is but a deceiving profession, and requires more craft than 
wisdom. All which considered, I did not read that part of your author (PL 1.13). 
 
 16 
Cavendish is clear that she will avoid politics and state affairs. An earlier version of that view 
appeared back in 1653, in the Poems, and Fancies [P&F]. In the “Epistle to Mistris Toppe” Cavendish 
justifies her writing of the book. In doing so, she lists several things she could do which would be 
worse, including “to busie my selfe out of the Sphear of our Sex, as in Politicks of State”. 
Cavendish also seems reluctant to call herself a moral philosopher. Consider another passage 
from her discussion of Hobbes: “I perceive your Author is much for necessitation, and against free-
will, which I leave to Moral Philosophers and Divines” (PL 1.29).17 Earlier, there is a short essay, 
“To Morall Philosophers” in the Poems, and Fancies (P&F 51-2), which one might perhaps take as 
expressing the same view, as it is addressed to them, rather than from one of them. 
There is moral reflection in Cavendish’s works though. I considered several examples from 
the Poems, and Fancies above, but those are not the only relevant passages in the book. One section of 
it is headed “Moral Discourses” (P&F 92-109). Elsewhere we find a series of poems in which 
Cavendish uses geometry, and in particular the squaring of the circle, as a metaphor for the relations 
between virtues (P&F 47-50).18 
Poems, and Fancies is moreover not the only book in which Cavendish makes moral remarks, 
and those are not the only topics on which she makes them. To take a different example, we find 
Cavendish commenting in several places on the ethics of love and relationships. We find for 
instance her opposition to Platonic love – “for this opinion is dangerous, especially for married 
Women, by reason the conversation of the Souls may be a great temptation, and a means to bring 
Platonick Lovers to a neerer acquaintance, not allowable by the Laws of Marriage, although by the 
sympathy of the Souls” (PL 2.29) – and her related harsh views about the appropriate punishment of 
adulterous women, who “are Matrimonial Traitors … [who] ought to suffer Death, and their 
                                               
17 There are five other mentions of moral philosophy in PL, including notably two passages that 
identity moral philosophy with natural theology (PL 4.15, 4.22).  
18 Here see also Sokol (2003). 
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Executioner ought to be their Husband” (SL 26).19 
Beyond the various particular remarks, we should note Cavendish’s fondness for publishing 
pairs of works: one in natural philosophy, the other containing (possibly related, and more morally 
inclined) reflections. Most famously perhaps, the Observations was paired with the Blazing World. But 
the Philosophical Letters also forms a pair with the Sociable Letters, and if the Philosophical Fancies had 
been published together with the Poems, and Fancies, as Cavendish apparently originally planned, 
those two works would have fit this model as well. For all this fondness for pairing works though, in 
none of these cases does Cavendish present the reflective work as the systematic development of the 
natural philosophical one. 
Cavendish’s work undeniably contains moral reflection and moral assertions. She did not 
think that these reflections contributed to a scientific inquiry, something like Hobbes’s civil science. 
It is not even clear that she thought this reflection ought to be called moral philosophy. It is 
nevertheless present, and we can sensibly ask what, if anything, it had to do with her panpsychism.20 
 
4.2 Did Cavendish not have arguments for those later views? 
Cavendish does offer some arguments for her panpsychism. One might suggest that these 
arguments both motivated and justified the view, leaving nothing for my developmental story to 
explain.  
 One prominent argument of Cavendish’s rests on the need to explain the regular workings 
of nature.21 So, in the 1668 Ground of Natural Philosophy, Cavendish says: 
IF Nature were not Self-knowing, Self-living, and also Perceptive, she would run into 
                                               
19 She was at the same time not one to praise marriage, saying it “most commonly knocks all quick 
Spirits on the Head, and buries all Wit and Mirth, giving Life only to Care and Trouble” (World's Olio 
78). 
20 Cavendish’s unwillingness to consider her moral views part of moral philosophy, strictly speaking, 
lends some support to the thought that she does not see it as part of an overall moral system. 
21 The arguments of PL 4.30, which I quoted above, are related to this. 
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Confusion: for, there could be neither Order, nor Method, in Ignorant motion; neither 
would there be distinct kinds or sorts of Creatures, nor such exact and methodical Varieties 
as there are: for, it is impossible to make orderly and methodical Distinctions, or distinct 
Orders, by Chances: Wherefore, Nature being so exact (as she is) must needs be Self-
knowing and Perceptive: And though all her Parts, even the Inanimate Parts, are Self-
knowing, and Self-living; yet, onely her Self-moving Parts have an active Life, and a 
perceptive Knowledg (Ground 7). 
To consider the extent to which an argument of this sort drives Cavendish’s mature view, I look at 
when this argument appears in her work.22 
 Consider first the relevant works of the 1650s, the Philosophical Fancies of 1653 and the first 
edition of the Philosophical and Physical Opinions from 1655. Cavendish gives an explanation for the 
orderly progress of nature in those texts. It is this: “The Reason, that there is not 
a Confusion in Nature, but an orderly Course therein, is, the Eternal matter is alwayes one, and 
the same: for though there are Infinite degrees, yet the Nature of that Matter never alters” (PPO1 5; PF 
10). That is, Cavendish argues that the nature is orderly or regular because the nature of matter 
never changes. Later she would argue, differently, that nature is orderly or regular because of what 
the nature of matter is. These are not the same argument.  
 The regularity argument for Cavendish’s panpsychism seems first to appear in her 
discussions of atomism. As Sarasohn (2010, 103) notes, Cavendish uses regularity to argue against 
atomism in the first edition of the Opinons: an atomic system would be a disordered one. A revised 
version of that argument appears in the 1663 second edition of the Opinions, where Cavendish adds 
that atomists could avoid the noted problem if the atoms were each animated individual substances 
                                               
22 This is not the only way to understand Cavendish’s reasoning, though it is a prominent one. 
Detlefsen (2007) argues that freedom, rather than order, is the fundamental thing that Cavendish 
seeks to explain with her panpsychism, the explanation of order then being a derivative one.  
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which coordinated their actions, though that view would encounter other difficulties.23 The thought 
that inanimate atoms could not explain the regularity of nature recurs in the Observations in 1666 
(OEP 258). More generally, and outside a discussion of atomism, Cavendish argues in the 
Observations that her animate matter view explains how “the infinite parts of nature should move so 
variously, nay, so orderly and methodically as they do” (OEP 139), and had argued similarly in the 
Philosophical Letters.24 As we have seen, she would go on to state the argument at greater length in the 
Ground. 
 The regularity argument for Cavendish’s view clearly was present in the texts of the 1660s, 
but plays a relatively small role in them. This small role in those texts suggests that the argument was 
not, in Cavendish’s mind, the central justification for the view. That, plus the fact that the argument 
assumes a greater role as time goes on, suggests that thinking about how to explain regularity was 
also not a main part of Cavendish’s motivation for her view. 
Cavendish aimed, in the 1660s, to develop something that looks like a serious system of 
natural philosophy. My question is how that relates to some of the early poems. And my suggestion 
is that Cavendish’s environmental ethic – her concern for nature and its non-human creatures, and 
what they would say if only they could talk – became more literal, and transformed in to her 
panpsychism.25  
 
4.3 The role of Cavendish’s atomism 
I have suggested that one important root of Cavendish’s panpsychist system lies in poems of the 
                                               
23 Cavendish thinks the atoms would be unlikely to agree in the necessary ways, so, the only view 
that can really avoid the problem of disorder is her own monistic panpsychism. 
24 PL 4.15, 4.30.  
25 Semler (2012) makes a related suggestion, using the notions of ‘poetic selection’ and ‘philosophical 
revisitation’. His thesis, about engagement with Descartes and Hobbes, is different from mine. But 
the notion that something like this process went on – initial selection of views for non-philosophical 
reasons, and the later incorporation of those views within Cavendish’s philosophy – is shared. 
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Poems, and Fancies that express concern for non-human parts of nature and ask what they think.  
A further objection may occur to the reader here. Perhaps the origin of Cavendish’s mature 
natural philosophy can indeed be found in her first book, the Poems, and Fancies. But is the best 
candidate for that origin not the early natural philosophy, rather than the early ethics? More 
specifically, we find in Poems, and Fancies a series of atomist poems. Is this not Cavendish’s first 
natural philosophy, which she then developed into her later (non-atomist) system? 
That suggestion hinges on a view that is common in the secondary literature: that Cavendish 
was an atomist when she wrote Poems, and Fancies, but then moved away from that view.26 To the 
extent that there is debate about such issues, it is largely about when she gave up her atomism.27 
The evidence for that view is that there are atomist poems in Cavendish’s first book, the 
1653 Poems, and Fancies, but there is no atomism in her later works. The existence of the atomist 
poems is incontestable.28 I question, however whether they show that Cavendish in fact believed, or 
wished to assert as part of her philosophy, that atoms existed. Perhaps, instead, we should take these 
too as fancies, and Cavendish to be playing with atomist ideas in the course of writing poetry, rather 
than presenting an atomist natural philosophy.29 
One way to approach the issue is to think about the alleged move away from atomism. 
When is this supposed to have happened? It can have happened no later than 1655, when Cavendish 
published the first edition of her Philosophical and Physical Opinions, with its “Condemning Treatise of 
Atomes”. That itself is no problem for the common view – it just points to an early transition. 
                                               
26 It is common but not universal. I agree with Boyle (2018, 57) when she says that “we should not 
take Cavendish to be presenting atomism as a true account of nature any more than she was 
presenting her fairy stories as true”. 
27 Detlefsen (2006) is a good guide to this apparent disappearance of the atomism, and a good 
argument against the view that it was never given up. 
28 There is a broader question about how Cavendish’s use of atomism fits in the history of 
seventeenth-century English poetry. See Clucas (1991) and Dodds (2013, 78-90). 
29 O’Neill does not go as far as I do, but does comment on Cavendish's attitude to atomism in 1653 
(Cavendish 2001, xv-xvi), and argue that Cavendish’s “commitment to an animistic materialism [as 
opposed to atomism] dates from far earlier than 1661” (Cavendish 2001, xx). 
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Complications start to arise when we think about the second book Cavendish published in 1653, the 
Philosophical Fancies. We might think of this as the first version of the Philosophical and Physical Opinions. 
Indeed, it was incorporated into that book. The material does not seem to advocate atomism when it 
appears in the 1655 text. Why would we take it to advocate atomism in the 1653 text?  
It is true that the Philosophical Fancies does not contain the “Condemning Treatise of 
Atomes”, so it lacks an explicit rejection of atomism. But it does not contain explicit advocacy of 
atomism either. Indeed, the only mention of atoms appears to be this: “So Matter that is thinnest or 
thickest, softest or hardest, yet it is but one Matter; for if it were divided by degrees, untill it came to 
an Atome, that Atome would still be the same Matter, as well as the greatest bulk. But we cannot say 
smallest, or biggest, thickest or thinnest, softest or hardest in Infinite” (2-3). That is hardly an 
endorsement of atomism, and the claim that we “cannot say smallest” looks like a denial of it, for it 
suggests we cannot say there is a smallest material thing. In sum, atomism is not the view of the 
Philosophical Fancies. So if Cavendish did move away from atomism, this move happened between her 
1653 books. 
Consider Cavendish’s own retrospective take on this issue, in the Observations. There she tells 
us that “the opinion of atoms, is fitter for a poetical fancy, than for serious philosophy; and this is 
the reason that I have waived it in my philosophical works” (Observations 129). One can say all sorts 
of things in a work of fancy without asserting them to be true, or part of one’s philosophical system. 
Saying Cavendish was not taking the atomism together literally and seriously is thus to take her own 
word. Indeed, and not just at her retrospective word, but also at her word in Poems, and Fancies. 
Consider what she says “To Naturall Philosophers”: “I cannot say, I have not heard of Atomes, and 
Figures, and Motion, and Matter; but not throughly reason'd on: but if I do erre, it is no great matter; for 
my Discourse of them is not to be accounted Authentick […] And the Reason why I write it in Verse, 
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is, because I thought Errours might better passe there, then in Prose; since Poets write most Fiction, and 
Fiction is not given for Truth, but Pastime…”.30 Cavendish was not, I argue, philosophically attached 
to atomism, even when she wrote the Poems, and Fancies. There she is certainly playing with atomist 
ideas, as she is playing with others, but she does not assert them. 
This talk of fancies also helps explain how Cavendish seemingly held both the atomist and 
the non-atomist views in 1653. If there were such a transition in Cavendish’s thought as is often 
claimed, it would have had to have happened in 1653, between Poems, and Fancies and Philosophical 
Fancies. Cavendish had intended to publish those together. That pair of volumes would have been 
problematically inconsistent if it had been asserting two philosophical views: that there are atoms, 
and that there are not atoms. If we are dealing with atomist fancies, rather than assertions, the 
situation is rather different.  
Though Cavendish thought and write about atomism, she did not assert or believe it – she 
regarded it as fancy.31 Thus there is in an important sense no such thing as Cavendish’s early 
atomism, and no puzzle about when and how she gave it up. Atomism was not the early natural 
philosophy out of which Cavendish developed her later view, because it was not the early natural 
philosophy.32 Now, this does not prevent someone from regarding it as a source for the later view, 
in something like the way I’m regarding the environmental ethical views. But we should not lose 
sight of the fact that the atomism was, primarily, something with which Cavendish played fancifully 
and poetically. It was not an early system of natural philosophy that she abandoned for a later one. 
 
                                               
30 See also Clucas (1994, 261). 
31 Walter Charleton, in a letter to Cavendish (Letters and Poems, 142-9), argues that her theories are 
worth hearing because they are delightful, and there’s pleasure in the delightful products of fancy. 
That is, he is defending Cavendish by moving her work away from the sphere of things about which 
we ask whether they are true (never mind the sphere of things we actually think are true). On 
Charleton on Cavendish, see Sarasohn (2010, 48-9), Semler (2011), and Semler (2013). 
32 If something is to have the title of ‘Cavendish’s early natural philosophy’, that should be the views 
of PF and PPO1. 
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5. Conclusion 
To conclude, I would like to recall the four themes I highlighted from Cavendish’s Poems, and Fancies: 
that man treats nature poorly; the ethics of our treatment of animals; non-literal panpsychism; and finally 
speculation and the ‘who knows?’ argument. 
I have suggested, in particular in relation to the third and fourth themes, some connections 
between the views of the Poems, and Fancies and the later works of natural philosophy. My speculative 
suggestion is that the metaphorical encounters – the non-literal panpsychism – harden into a more 
literal panpsychism, but to a considerable extent without supporting argument. An initial inclination 
to consider what the rest of the world might be thinking helped Cavendish along the way to the view 
that it really was. These are causal connections, not systematic or deductive ones. 
Even if one rejects that speculation about development, a more basic point about 
connections between Cavendish’s views is illustrated here. Cavendish did have views about moral 
matters, and we might call this her moral philosophy. Her views in environmental ethics in the 
Poems, and Fancies provide a striking example of this moral philosophy. She was however reluctant to 
call such thoughts moral philosophy herself. That is because they were not part of her systematic 
enquiry into the world, which she referred to as ‘natural philosophy’, not simply as ‘philosophy’.  
Cavendish’s contemporaries Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza all thought of philosophy as a 
systematic enterprise aimed at understanding the world, one that ought to proceed from or through 
natural philosophy to its ultimate and highest goal, the true moral science. That was not how 
Cavendish approached philosophy. The better model for her approach is a more current one, that of 
a scientist (or natural philosopher) who has ethical opinions. Such opinions may relate in one way or 
another to their philosophical or scientific work, without the scientist having anything like an early 
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modern philosophical system.33 
                                               
33 I thank audiences at Duke University and the University of North Carolina - Asheville for very 
helpful discussions, and Adela Deanova for her commentary on my paper at Duke. Thanks also to 
Noah Delwiche and Antonia LoLordo for their comments. 
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